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"THIS MUST HAVE BEEN A GRAND SIGHT" 
GEORGE BENT AND THE BATTLE OF PLATTE BRIDGE 
STEVEN C. HAACK 
The Battle of Platte Bridge, July 26, 1865, is a 
noteworthy event in the annals of the Ameri-
can Indian Wars. An alliance of Cheyenne, 
Sioux, and Arapahoe, numbering in excess of 
2,000 warriors, traveled three days to a specific 
military objective, an undertaking unusual 
both in terms of its magnitude and its level 
of organization. The battle is also of interest 
because we have a detailed description of the 
event written from the Native American view-
point. This description comes in the form of a 
number of letters written to George Hyde by 
Southern Cheyenne George Bent. 
George Bent, son of the famous trader 
William Bent and Owl Woman, a Southern 
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Cheyenne, was educated in white schools in 
Westport, Missouri, and St. Louis. Injured at 
the Sand Creek Massacre, he joined the hostile 
forces that traveled north in the spring of 1865 
to ally themselves with the Native Americans 
in the Powder River region. Bent joined the 
raiding parties that came down to the North 
Platte in May and June and was a participant 
in the Battle of Platte Bridge and the Battle of 
Red Buttes, both of which took place on July 
26, 1865. Bent went on to serve as a translator 
and government liaison to the Cheyenne for 
decades on the reservation in Oklahoma. l 
Bent established relations with a number 
of historians and ethnographers, most notably 
George Bird Grinnell. Although productive, 
these relationships frequently proved frustrat-
ing for both parties. Bent often felt that the 
researchers worked in a piecemeal way, were 
not deferential to the elders with whom he 
had arranged interviews, and failed to publish 
the information they acquired in a timely 
manner. 2 As he watched the elders around him 
age and die, he was acutely aware that the his-
tory, wisdom, and lore of the Cheyenne people 
were vanishing. It was his desire that a book 
be produced preserving all that he and others 
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could remember about his people. In 1904 Bent 
began a correspondence with George Hyde, 
an independent scholar in Omaha, Nebraska. 
From 1905 until his death in 1918, Bent wrote 
over 300 letters to Hyde. Hyde completed the 
manuscript shortly before Bent's death but was 
unable to find a publisher for it. He eventually 
sold the manuscript and a number of the letters 
to the Denver Public Library. His manuscript 
was rediscovered in 1966 and the book was 
finally published in 1968.3 
Hyde was particularly interested in the 
geographic locations mentioned by Bent, 
especially those along the Arkansas River in 
Colorado and Kansas and the watershed of 
western Kansas. Bent would occasionally draw 
maps to illustrate his narrations, but Hyde 
would also prepare maps, some quite detailed, 
and mail them to Bent, requesting that par-
ticular trails or encampments be marked and 
the map returned. Bent was generally accom-
modating in this regard, though Hyde's notes 
occasionally express frustration over Bent's 
lack of cooperation. It appears that in the 
course of writing his book, Hyde separated the 
maps from their corresponding letters, and in 
most cases, they were never reunited. 
Eight of the letters Bent wrote to Hyde 
mention the Battle of Platte Bridge, and three 
of them have long, detailed descriptions of the 
preparations for the battle, the journey to the 
area, and the battle itself. In addition, two of 
the letters, dated May 22, 1906, and November 
10, 1915, refer to maps that apparently accom-
panied those letters. The 1906 letter is now 
held in the Coe Collection at Yale University, 
which in fact holds the bulk of Bent's let-
ters. The 1915 letter is held in the Western 
Americana Collection at the Denver Public 
Library. Neither of these archives, however, has 
the maps, which are held in the archives of the 
University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries.4 
These maps are among fourteen acquired in 
1928 from John Van Male, a Denver book 
dealer who had purchased them from Hyde.5 
Terrain is always a major factor in any mili-
tary confrontation, and the battles of July 26, 
1865, are no exception. The dominant feature 
of the area was the North Platte River, a wide, 
braided river with deep channels and a broad 
floodplain in which the channels wandered. 
When the water ran high, the river constituted 
a barrier that wagons could cross only by bridge. 
At other times, it could be readily crossed at 
a number of fords. The sandy soil around the 
river was easily eroded, and the many ravines 
leading to the river were quite deep, with steep 
sides. These ravines and the vegetation that 
grew in them provided good cover for com-
batants. Bluffs and mesas are common in the 
area and provide high ground from which the 
surrounding area is visible for many miles. The 
high ground may seem to be the ideal location 
for a military installation, but in the arid envi-
ronment of the High Plains, the availability 
of water is more important than the tactical 
advantage of elevation. Platte Bridge Station 
was located in a loop of the river. The terrain 
was open to the south and east. A tributary 
enters the river from the northwest about a 
mile downstream from Platte Bridge Station. 
Known by the soldiers as Dry Creek, it is now 
known as Casper Creek. 
What follows is a description and explica-
tion of the Battle of Platte Bridge as it was 
presented in the letters of George Bent. I also 
examine one map he created of the battlefield, 
as well as another map drawn by George Hyde 
and annotated by Bent. Additionally, a com-
parison of these maps to a contemporary topo-
logical map of the area is introduced to help in 
our understanding of Bent. 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
In large part, the motivation for the attack 
at Platte Bridge Station lay far to the south 
on the plains of western Kansas and eastern 
Colorado. The government's relationship with 
the Native Americans throughout the Great 
Plains had been in a state of deterioration since 
the early 1860s. The settlements and emigrant 
trains had depleted many of the resources 
upon which the Native population depended. 
August of 1864 saw an explosion of violence 
against white settlers, starting on the Little 







FIG. 1. Map of Wyoming showing current day cities Casper and Cheyenne in relation to the North Platte River, 
Platte Bridge Station, and Ft. Caspar. Based on the map, "Indian Battles and Skirmishes, 1854-1876," in State 
Maps on File, Mountain & Prairie, Wyoming, 8.17, by Facts On File Publishing, New York, NY, 1984. Used by 
permission. Map is not to scale. 
Blue River in south-central Nebraska and 
spreading out along the Overland Trail. The 
escalating pattern of raids and reprisals came to 
a head in late November of 1864 with the Sand 
Creek Massacre, when Col. John Chivington 
led an attack of Colorado Volunteers on an 
encampment of Arapahoe and Southern 
Cheyenne Indians. Some 200 were killed, 
mostly women, children, and the elderly. In 
response, large numbers of Arapahoe, Sioux, 
and Cheyenne came together and headed 
north, raiding ranches, outposts, and emigrant 
trains as they went. In early February the army 
post at Julesburg was attacked. Soldiers were led 
by decoys into an ambush and eighteen were 
killed. Raiding at the ranches and along the 
road resulted in the closing of the Overland 
Trail to all but heavily escorted traffic. 6 
After confronting the party at Mud Springs 
and Rush Creek in early February, William 
Collins estimated the force to consist of 
between 2,000 and 3,000 warriors and their 
camp at 800 to 1,000 lodges. He was prescient 
in his warning that these Indians would join 
their brethren in the Powder River area and 
organize attacks on the traffic and installations 
along the North Platte River: 
They are well armed and mounted; have 
many rifled muskets and plenty of ammuni-
tion, including minie cartridges with ounce 
balls; are full of venom and bent on revenge 
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for the loss of their people south. So soon 
as they reach the Indians north they will 
excite and perhaps compel them to become 
hostile. The posts on the Platte, especially 
Deer Creek and Platte Bridge, which are 
within 100 miles of Powder river, will be in 
immediate danger.7 
In response to Collins's warning, the stations 
along the North Platte River, spaced at inter-
vals of about fifty miles, were improved with the 
addition of stockades and facilities adequate to 
accommodate about one hundred soldiers. 
Other plans were in the offing as well. In 
February, Brig. Gen. Patrick Connor was put 
in charge of the newly created District of the 
Plains. He immediately began organizing a 
punitive expedition into the Powder River 
Basin. On March 29, Maj. Gen. Grenville M. 
Dodge, commander of the District of Missouri, 
wired Connor that he had 2,000 mounted 
men en route: "I want this force pushed right 
on after the Indians." In a second wire sent 
on the same day he states, "With the force at 
your disposal you can make vigorous war upon 
the Indians and punish them so that they will 
be forced to keep the peace." Dodge went on 
to outline a plan to construct and provision 
depots and recruit manpower from the ranks of 
Confederate prisoners.8 The plan was to strike 
before the grass grew, catching the enemy 
before their war ponies recovered from the 
rigors of the High Plains winter. 
Thus, as spring stretched toward summer, 
both sides were expecting a major confronta-
tion-one that would, depending upon the side 
consulted, either strike a blow of vengeance for 
Sand Creek and keep the white man out of the 
Native Americans' last stronghold, or punish 
the Indians for their years of depredations and 
force them to accommodate westward expan-
sion. Both sides were planning. The army set 
to work utilizing a complex system involv-
ing centralized production, supply lines, and 
troop movements. This system had already 
been stretched to its limits by the Civil War. 
Horses and equipment were in short supply and 
soldiers were clamoring to be mustered out of 
service. The Native Americans, unencumbered 
by such concerns, got in the first shot. 
PLATTE BRIDGE STATION 
The bridge that would become the focus 
of the Indians' summer campaign was a very 
impressive structure. Built in 1859 at the 
location of present-day Casper, Wyoming, it 
was about 1,000 feet long. Spanning across 
twenty-eight log cribs, it served as a toll bridge 
for wagons on the Oregon Trail. Several rude 
buildings had stood at its southern end since 
its construction, serving the needs of tele-
graph operators and Pony Express personnel, 
but in the spring of 1865, construction was 
commenced on improvements. The accom-
modations would eventually include a laundry, 
a blacksmith shop, officers' quarters, squad 
rooms, storehouses, and a kitchen. A small 
stockade, measuring forty-five feet square, was 
bordered by structures on the north, stables on 
the west, and a nine-foot-high palisade to the 
east and south? 
The Kansas Eleventh Cavalry was ordered 
to report to Fort Laramie in February. Starting 
from Fort Riley, they commenced upon a 
miserable trek through winter storms via 
Fort Kearney and Julesburg, arriving at Fort 
Laramie on April 19. Most of the men were 
inadequately clothed for such a journey, and a 
third of them had no horses. Half the compa-
nies were sent south to Fort Halleck while the 
rest were distributed among the stations along 
the North Platte. The Kansas Eleventh set up 
headquarters a few miles south of the bridge 
at the base of what is now Casper Mountain, 
the northern terminus of the Laramie range. 
This site, named Camp Dodge, would serve as 
headquarters for several months. Timber was 
hauled from the mountain for the construction 
of the improvements at the bridge. The Kansas 
Eleventh moved into their new accommoda-
tions in early July. Most of the men had signed 
up for a three-year enlistment in August of 
1862, so their period of enlistment was nearing 
its end. They were informed on July 15 that 
they would be returning to Kansas as soon 
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as they were relieved by the Michigan Sixth 
Cavalry.lO 
The soldiers stationed on the North Platte 
were bedeviled by undependable supply lines, 
inadequate rations, and poor mounts. The task 
of patrolling and repairing the telegraph line 
was frustrating. Their horses were no match for 
the sturdy Indian ponies and would often give 
out under the stress of a chase. The Indians had 
come to understand the strategic importance of 
the telegraph lines and could easily tear out a 
few hundred yards of it while passing through 
the area. Sometimes they would break the line 
at a point where the surrounding terrain facili-
tated an ambush, and there they would wait 
for the repair crew. The soldiers learned that it 
was necessary to travel in groups of twenty or 
more'!! 
The war party that arrived in the vicinity 
of Platte Bridge on the morning of July 25 did 
a masterful job of concealing its true size. The 
soldiers at the bridge had been confronted a 
number of times by raiding parties consisting of 
a few dozen to a few hundred warriors, and the 
initial confrontation appeared to fit this pat-
tern. The morning started with routine duties. 
John Crumb and two others were tending the 
horse herd. According to Crumb, 
I with two other of the boys had taken our 
herd of horses across the bridge to the north 
to graze. There was a nice little bottom cov-
ered with good grass extending down to the 
mouth of Casper Creek. We were well down 
to the lower end of this bottom when the 
boy I had out on picket on a high hill east 
of the creek fired three shots, our danger 
signal. He could see well nigh the whole 
length of the creek. We got the horses well 
started for the bridge when I sent the other 
boy down to the water's edge, opposite camp 
to fire the signal, as the wind was blowing 
very strong from the south, and I didn't 
think they could hear the first signal. That 
brought the boys out, they met us on the 
bridge and secured their horses. 
In the meantime, Indians rushed out of 
Casper Creek and swarmed up the bottom, 
but we had the horses all on the bridge as 
they rushed past. They didn't even exchange 
shots with us as they rushed by not more 
than twenty-five yards from us three that 
were driving the herd. 
Thus began an unsuccessful decoy operation. 
The Indians were less interested in the herd 
than they were in baiting the soldiers into pur-
suing them five miles to the northwest where 
the main body of warriors awaited. Crumb 
continues: 
The whole company scattered out over the 
hills, two to a dozen in a place and followed 
the Indians back well onto the hills until 
it looked as though there were Indians 
enough to eat us all up, but they don't like 
a man on foot with a carbine in his hands. 
The Captain had the recall sounded and we 
returned to camp, followed by the Indians at 
long range.!2 
Crazy Head, a Cheyenne participant, noted 
in a statement to Grinnell that the better part 
of the day was spent attempting to lure the 
soldiers out, to no avail, until the chiefs sent 
High Back Wolf out to order them to return 
to camp.13 At that point, a number of warriors, 
including High Back Wolf, crossed the river 
near the mouth of Casper Creek to raid the sta-
tion's beef herd. A detail of about thirty soldiers 
rushed out to the herd and drove the Indians 
back, killing High Back Wolf in the process. 
The commander at the station, Maj. Martin 
Anderson, spurred by these disturbing events, 
took an inventory of the situation. About 
ninety able-bodied men were on duty with 
twenty rounds of ammunition available for 
each rifle.!4 The telegraph line to the east was 
down. He had no idea, of course, of the mass of 
warriors behind the hill six miles to the north. 
The typical complement of men at the sta-
tion was just over one hundred, but two dozen 
members of the Kansas Eleventh Cavalry were 
absent, having left on the morning of July 22 to 
escort a contingent of Ohio soldiers fifty miles 
up the road to the Sweetwater Station. This 
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detail, led by Sgt. Amos Custard, had started 
the return trip with three empty wagons on the 
morning of the 25th, and at about the time of 
the skirmish at the herd, they were preparing 
to stay the night at Willow Springs, midway 
between Sweetwater and Platte Bridge.IS 
At about two o'clock the next morning, a 
contingent of Ohio men arrived on horseback 
from Sweetwater Station. Major Anderson 
was awakened and was urged to send an 
escort to the west to locate the wagon train 
and bring it back to the station under cover 
of darkness. Despite the warning signals of 
the previous day, Anderson said it could wait 
until morning. Thus it was that two dozen 
men saddled up shortly after sunrise and, 
under the command of Lt. Caspar Collins, 
crossed the bridge and headed up the road to 
the west. As they were preparing to leave, Lt. 
George Walker stood atop a building at the 
station and saw that Indians were concealed 
along the riverbank to the west of the station 
and also in the vicinity of Casper Creek. He 
alerted Major Anderson, who ordered more 
men to cross the bridge on foot to hold the 
northern end in the event the detail was 
attacked and had to return.16 Soon after cross-
ing the bridge, Collins took his party north of 
the road, traveling along a ridge from which 
he had a good view of the surrounding terrain. 
When the detail was about a mile from the 
bridgehead, the Indians attacked. All witness 
accounts express astonishment at the number 
of warriors coming out of every ravine and 
from behind every hillock. Collins wheeled 
his men around and headed back to the bridge 
through a crush of warriors. Simultaneously, 
hundreds of warriors poured out of Casper 
Creek and rushed the men at the bridgehead. 
The soldiers repelled these attackers and held 
the bridgehead long enough for the detail to 
return. Twenty members of the Collins party 
managed to regain the bridge, most suffering 
injuries. Five were killed, including Caspar 
CollinsP 
The men at the station, finally aware of 
the magnitude of the force they faced, set to 
work securing their position as best they could. 
Before long the wagon train from Sweetwater 
Station was sighted descending through a 
gap between hills five miles to the west. The 
Indians perceived the train at the same time 
and made a headlong rush in its direction. 
The ensuing fight would become known as the 
Battle of Red Buttes, though the geological 
feature of that name actually lies six miles to 
the west of the battlefield. 
The initial attack at the wagon train was 
certainly chaotic. It appears that the soldiers 
stopped their wagons and attempted to form 
a skirmish line before the leading edge of the 
attacking force struck them. According to 
Crazy Head's statement, "American Horse says 
that when they got near soldiers, these tried to 
fall in line, but their hearts seemed to fail them 
and they ran back to the wagons which were 
close behind. They tried to corral the wagons 
but there was not time and they halted the 
wagons in line."18 Five soldiers were cut off from 
the main body and escaped down a ravine and 
across the North Platte River. On the south 
bank of the river, one of these men killed Left 
Hand, brother of the famous warrior Roman 
Nose. Two of the soldiers who escaped across 
the river were killed, but the other three man-
aged to work their way back to the station. One 
of them, James Shrader of Company D, would 
travel to Casper from his home in Oskaloosa, 
Kansas, some sixty years later to help local 
historian Robert S. Ellison reconstruct the 
battle.19 
While most of the Indians were at the wagon 
train, Major Anderson ordered a detail to find 
and repair the break in the telegraph line to 
the east. Bent was with the Indian forces at the 
wagon train at this time and makes no mention 
of this sortie, which was ultimately unsuccess-
ful. However, a description of the effort illus-
trates the difficulties imposed by the terrain 
along the river. Figure 2 is a reproduction of 
a map that accompanied an article published 
in 1918 by Lt. George M. Walker, who led the 
detail to repair the telegraph line. He wrote: 
Over a mile east of the station was a small 
creek, which, owing to the shape of its 
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FIG. 2. Lt. George M. Walker's 1918 map, illustrating the terrain in the vicinity of Platte Bridge Station. See Map 
Note 1. 
banks, had to be crossed at fords. The ford 
on the telegraph road was hidden from view 
of the station by a low mound. East of the 
creek was a low ridge a half mile wide, and 
beyond lay the valley in which the herd had 
been attacked on the previous day. The ford 
was considered a danger point, as the Indian 
ford of the river was about a half mile north, 
and the Indians were congregating on the 
north bank. Major Anderson ordered the 
infantry Captain to take his men to this 
mound and guard the ford until the repair 
force returned. He ordered me, in case the 
howitzer was fired, to drop all work and 
bring my men in at once. The Indian ford 
could be seen from the station, but not from 
the telegraph line east of the creek. We 
found one thousand feet of wire had been 
destroyed in the valley near where the herd 
had been attacked. I directed one picket to 
be sent north along the ridge to watch the 
Indian ford, and two, Chappel and Porter, to 
the high ground east.20 
Soon after the two parties commenced work on 
the ends of the break, the report of the how-
itzer signaled imminent danger. In the poorly 
coordinated retreat, one soldier was killed and 
another seriously injured. 
Sergeant Custard and the other soldiers at 
the wagon train managed to hold out for sev-
eral hours, but the end was inevitable. Major 
Anderson could not send relief. Any detail large 
enough to avoid being swallowed by the forces 
opposing them would leave the station inad-
equately defended. In the late afternoon, smoke 
was seen rising from the site, indicating that the 
wagons had been overrun and set on fire. 
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NATIVE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
Bent's letters constitute an important record 
of the time, his descriptions often providing 
the only written account of events from the 
Native American viewpoint. He makes little 
pretense to objectivity, often underestimating 
the casualties suffered by the warriors beside 
whom he fought. He rarely mentions events 
that enraged the white population, such as 
attacks upon civilian settlers and emigrants, 
concentrating instead on confrontations with 
the military. His descriptions are so disarming 
in their simple clarity and economy of words 
that, especially in conjunction with the maps, 
it is illuminating to read his descriptions ver-
batim. Many of Bent's letters are written in 
an almost stream-of-consciousness manner, 
skipping from topic to topic with little regard 
for the rules of punctuation. We are thus 
fortunate that two of his letters are long and 
coherent narrations dealing exclusively with 
the events surrounding the attack on Platte 
Bridge Station. 
The map included with Bent's letter of May 
22, 1906, is in poor condition and is difficult 
to read (Fig. 3.). Bent drew the map from the 
Indians' perspective with the river running 
across the top of the page. It has been inverted 
to agree in orientation with the remainder of 
the maps. 
Figure 4 is a rough map drawn by Hyde 
and sent to Bent with the request that he use 
it to show the locations of the various soldier 
societies. The locations for the camp, stockade, 
bridge, and the course of the road is drawn by 
Hyde, not Bent. Bent returned it with a short 
letter dated November 10, 1915. The letter 
indicates that Bent had conferred with several 
other veterans of the battle. He notes that the 
Indians had all wished Collins had gotten far-
ther from the fort before the attack had com-
menced, and he claims, "There was no signal. 
Soon as Big Horn and his party charged from 
the river, every band made charge fot Collins' 
men." Bent also expresses bewilderment over 
Collins's failure to detect the ambush. "I am 
always at loss why Collins did not see the heads 
of Indians and not to be such foolish to make 
the trip up the river.,,21 
Figure 5 represents the modern topography 
of the region corresponding to that of Figure 3. 
The area covered by the box in the lower central 
part of Figure 5 corresponds to the area covered 
by Figure 4. 
Several of Bent's letters describe the raids 
he participated in during the months preced-
ing the main offensive. A number of these are 
sufficiently detailed that the particular raid can 
be recognized in the whites' records. While 
the raiding parties came south in late spring, 
the main encampment remained well to the 
north. Such a concentrated population quickly 
exhausted the resources in anyone area, so 
they constantly traveled about the river basins 
of northern Wyoming, pursuing the bison 
herds. Their final encampment before disem-
barking on the main offensive was on Crazy 
Woman's Creek, a tributary of the Powder 
River lying about one hundred miles north of 
Platte Bridge Station. In contrast to the many 
raiding parties that worked independently and 
with little coordination, the attack at Platte 
Bridge would be a major, carefully planned 
offensive. The moon was new on July 22 and 
this may have influenced the choice of the 
departure date. Upon reaching the Platte, the 
new crescent would be visible for only a short 
time after sunset, after which the darkness 
would help conceal the movements of warriors. 
Bent offers a detailed description of the pains-
taking preparation that preceded the trip. The 
group would bring a large number of horses, 
each warrior riding a horse and leading his war 
pony to ensure a mount fresh for battle. Bent 
himself led a sorrel racehorse of which he was 
clearly proud; his father had bought it for him 
in Denver for 500 dollars.22 About 200 women 
accompanied the war party.23 
Time was drawing for big war party to 
start. Foolish Dogs soldiers were selected 
to act as police to see that no war parties 
started out. Small war parties were even 
not allowed to start out. Foolish Dogs sent 
crier right away also ahnouncing if any 
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men had to be feasted while doing all this. 
They were some time getting to Crazy 
Woman's Creek. After being camped here 
for several days the chiefs gave it out to get 
ready for marching towards Platte Bridge. 
It was a great sight. Day before starting it 
was announced through the villages for all 
the bands of soldiers to get up their war 
horses, paint them up same as going into 
battle and put on all the war rigs, war bon-
nets, shields, lances, scalp shirts and all 
the medicine charms .... Those that got 
ready first rode out to the opening of the 
circle of the village Yz mile and waited until 
everybody got there. Each band formed in 
line. Bravest ones in battle were told to 
take lead and behind of these lines, there 
were 2 men in each line, 2 men in lead and 
4 in rear. Foolish Dogs took lead of all the 
bands. Dog Soldiers came last and behind 
everybody. Siouxs and Arapahoes took part 
also. These bands rode around inside of the 
circle of the village. The line must have 
been 2 miles long. Everybody was singing 
war songs. Women and old men standing 
in front of their lodges singing as the bands 
rode by in front. At night there was sing-
ing all through the village. Next morning, 
horses were in center of the village so the 
horses could be caught if they were to be 
taken along. The first day they did not go 
very far so everybody could come up. Each 
band of soldiers camped together. Chiefs 
of the three tribes went ahead always to 
locate the camp. Foolish Dogs acted as 
police on this march. Half of them took 
the lead and half of them came behind to 
see that everybody kept in the line. The 
chiefs rode ahead of the Foolish Dogs. The 
chiefs would dismount on march whenever 
they came to water and stop for little while 
for everybody to water their horses and get 
water for themselves and also take smoke 
with their pipes.24 
Bent does not specify how long the trip took, 
but Crazy Head is quite specific on the point: 
"They were three nights on the road and 
reached the place the third morning."25 This 
would have required the line to move about 
thirty miles per day. Bent continued: 
Before getting to Platte Bridge the chiefs 
selected several warriors to go ahead to 
Platte Bridge and find out how many soldiers 
were there and to come back and report 
what they had seen. These scouts came back 
that evening. This big party stopped on 
small stream. No timber on it. They told the 
chiefs what they had seen. This was given 
out through the war camp. Three old men 
on horseback one Cheyenne, one Sioux and 
one Arapahoe, cried this news out. I think 
there were 3,000 Indians in this war party. 
These criers also announced no singing 
would be allowed by Foolish Dogs. They 
were police in charge of the whole party. 
Next morning the chiefs selected ten more 
warriors to follow the creek they camped on 
to mouth as this creek ran just below north 
end of Platte Bridge. The Foolish Dog sol-
diers got on each side of the whole line of 
this big war party and the Dog Soldiers got 
in rear and bunched up the whole line from 
the rear. There was great crowd of warriors, 
old men and women. Of course, the chiefs 
were in lead in long line. Northern Chey-
enne, Southern Cheyenne, Sioux and 
Arapahoe chiefs were all in this line. In this 
line I seen Red Cloud and Old Man Afraid 
of His Horses with their scalp shirts on. 
Everybody was told not to go out of walk as 
it would make too much dust and the sol-
diers would see it and would know that big 
war party was coming. The chiefs came to 
big hill and stopped behind this hill. Those 
with spy glasses crawled up this hill to see if 
scouts had got to mouth of the creek. Now 
all the medicine making commenced. 
Everybody was notified to get ready for fight. 
War bonnets were taken out of sacks. The 
medicine bonnets were held by owners to 
south first, then to west, then to north, then 
to east. Last held up to sun, then put on. 
Medicine shields were held in right hand 
and dipped 4 times on ground, then held up 
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to sun and were shaken 4 times, then put on 
left side as the right hand is used to carry 
lance or war club. These warriors were to 
draw the soldiers toward this big hill. It was 
5 or 6 miles from bridge. They knew if they 
could get the soldiers this far out from the 
bridge they could kill them all before they 
could get back. Everybody began to string 
out behind the hill. Only the chiefs were 
allowed to look down this valley. Dull Knife, 
Northern Cheyenne, said in loud voice that 
soldiers were crossing the bridge, coming 
this way. It was not long after he said this 
that we heard firing. Everybody was now 
anxious to see over and made rush to where 
chiefs were sitting. The Foolish Dogs sol-
diers ran back several warriors after firing 
small arms. We heard cannon go off. Every-
body was now talking in excitement. We 
could all see down the valley and see our 
scouts and soldiers, cavalry and infantry 
were on each side of the cannon. We could 
see the smoke from the cannon whenever 
they fired it. These warriors seen they could 
not draw them away. They left them about 
noon and came back. Jules Seminole, half 
breed who was at stockade working for gov-
ernment told me that the soldiers and whites 
had no idea that big war party was after 
them as they had seen small war parties 
several times there before. Jules himself 
thought just small party was there to run off 
the stock. He said Casper [sic] Collins had 
orders not to follow any Indians unless they 
run off stock. This is why he did not follow 
these scouts or warriors. Said river was very 
high. Foolish Dogs and Dog Soldiers moved 
everybody back on this creek behind big hill 
to camp for the night. More scouts were sent 
at night to the bridge. My brother Charley 
went with this party. They did not return 
that night. Just at daylight everybody got 
ready for attack. Lot of them followed the 
creek down. I joined large party that stood 
behind big hills north of the bridge, 2 miles 
from the river. The road ran between our 
party and the river. Big party went west of 
bridge next to the river behind small bluff. I 
will mark the lines of Indians on paper so 
you will see how Casper Collins and his men 
came into the trap. About 9 o'clock we seen 
Collins coming across the bridge and took 
the road. I always thought he must have seen 
some heads of Indians. Everybody was on 
horses looking over towards Collins and his 
men going up the road. Collins was about 
one mile and half from the bridge when 
those at river charged at him first. Then 
those behind the hill that I was with made 
charge on him as he was making back for 
the bridge. Company of infantry with 
cannon ran across the bridge and fired the 
cannon at the Indians as they were closing 
in on Collins from all sides. I seen Casper 
Collins pass by me with arrow sticking in his 
forehead on his grey horse. He fell among 
the Indians the last I seen of him. Some 
soldiers got away and ran to this infantry. 
Indian by name of Slow Bull captured 
Collins' horse .... While we were standing 
on hills talking about the fight, Indians hol-
lered to us that they were signaling on 
horses that whites were in sight up the river. 
We all jumped on our horses and rode up the 
road in plain view of soldiers at the bridge. 
This must have been a grand sight for them 
as all the Indians were running up the river 
towards the government train that Caspar 
Collins was going out to meet that morning 
when he was killed. This was about 3 miles 
from bridge where train corralled in sand 
hills next to the river. When I got there I 
looked back down the road. As far as I could 
see the Indians were still coming. A lot of 
them were already fighting the soldiers. Just 
as my party were riding up lot of mules came 
running towards us. Indians were behind 
them. The soldiers got under the wagons 
and used their bedding, sacks of corn and 
mess boxes for breast works as they had time 
to do all this before the Indians got all 
around them. They saw Indians all around 
the bridge and where Collins' men were 
laying from where they first come up on hill. 
They could see plainly to the bridge as it was 
level to the bridge. They selected good place 
GEORGE BENT AND THE BATTLE OF PLATTE BRIDGE 15 
to fight from. It was kind of basin. This basin 
was about 100 yards wide each way as I took 
good look at it after the soldiers were all 
killed. 22 soldiers were killed in this party. 
One driver swam across and got away. This 
man shot Roman Nose's brother. Two 
Indians swam after him. He only had pistol 
buckled around his head when he swam the 
river. He hid in brush after he crossed and 
Roman Nose's brother ran onto him without 
seeing him and he shot him through the 
head. Nobody did not know he was killed for 
some time as everybody was busy with the 
soldiers fighting them. 8 Indians were killed 
in this battle. 4 soldiers were in wagons that 
done good shooting. All the wagons had 
covers on them and these 4 men cut holes in 
the sheets to shoot through. So much firing 
was going on, the Indians did not know that 
they were in wagons for some time. The 
Indians were shooting at those under the 
wagons. Someone spoke up. Smoke came 
from wagons as he seen it plain. He pointed 
out the wagon, then the Indians shot at this 
wagon several times, lot of them together. 
Wolf Tongue, "Twins," Roman Nose in fact 
several brave warriors said all to get ready, 
that they were going to ride around the 
wagons and empty the soldiers' guns, then 
those in front to charge up against the 
wagons. I stood up and seen these warriors 
with their war bonnets and shields on as 
they rode around the wagons. At first good 
many shots came from under wagons and 
only 3 or 4 from wagon, then all the Indians 
made war-hoop and charged from all sides. 
When I ran down there, it was only 60 
yards, they were shooting the soldiers under 
the wagons and those in the wagon. 3 of 
those had been killed. One soldier they 
threw out of the wagon and killed him on 
the ground. After this fight we all came back 
to where we stayed that night as we had left 
our pack ponies and saddles as Indians ride 
bare back in all the fights. Next morning 
good many war parties started again in dif-
ferent directions. Biggest party started for 
home. I was with this party.26 
Unfortunately, Bent reveals little of the 
battle plans, if any, the Indians had. In an ear-
lier letter he states, "The river was very high. 
The Indians intended to rush across the river 
but could not do so on account of the river 
being up."27It is possible that they originally 
intended to attack the station, at least in part, 
from the south side of the river rather than 
concentrating on the more easily defended 
bridgehead. Bent was depended upon for his 
skills in reading and speaking English. The 
Indians would often bring him objects of white 
manufacture they were unfamiliar with, such 
as canned goods, and ask him to explain them. 
He would also read written documents they had 
found. He was later employed as an interpreter 
when the Indians parlayed with the Sawyers 
Expedition. However, his insight into white 
ways seems not to have been truly exploited by 
the chiefs, at least not to the extent of bringing 
him into their tactical discussions. His letters 
suggest that his role was that of a warrior listen-
ing to orders and preparing to execute them. 
It is clear that on July 25, the main force of 
Indians remained behind the hills five miles up 
Casper Creek, apparently hoping that they could 
decoy the soldiers out to that area. Early on the 
second day, they approached much closer to the 
station. Such a large-scale operation probably 
began before dawn. A large contingent of war-
riors managed to conceal itself behind the hill a 
mile to the northwest, and others occupied the 
ravines west of the fort and along Casper Creek. 
The previous day, they had gotten the soldiers 
to fan out over the bottomland and along the 
creek, but they hadn't come far enough to fall 
into the Indians' ambush. It is possible that the 
Indians brought their forces into the immedi-
ate vicinity of the fort preparatory to another 
attempt at decoying the soldiers over the bridge, 
this time into a closer ambush. They did not 
attempt to entirely conceal their presence. One 
witness states that on the morning of the 26th, 
As soon as we could distinguish objects, we 
scanned the surrounding country to see if 
we could find any of our last evening's oppo-
nents. We did not make out any on our side 
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of the river, but on the north side there were 
some moving about and others squatted on 
the hills. Altogether there seemed to be 
about ninety in sight, just about the number 
we had been fighting the day before.28 
The much greater force remained concealed. 
When the attack on Collins commenced, the 
body that rushed the bridge from Casper Creek 
was estimated at five hundred.290f course, the 
Indians had no way of knowing that Collins 
would come over the bridge that morning 
and lead two dozen men between two of their 
forces, those behind the hill and those along 
the river. Whatever their plans were, the unex-
pected arrival of the Collins detail forced the 
Indians to act, revealing the true magnitude of 
the force and derailing any plans that required 
the element of surprise. 
The unexpected events of the morning, or 
possibly the difficulty of coordinating a large 
and diverse group, led to internal disruption. 
One of the "friend lies" living on the station 
grounds took the quite courageous step of 
eavesdropping on the enemy: 
[Wj e heard a good deal of loud talking among 
the Indians who were gathered together in a 
large body on the bluff, about three-fourths 
of a mile from us. They seemed very much 
excited and we expected they were making 
arrangements to make another charge on 
the bridge, and we prepared ourselves for 
the onset. ... At this time a half-breed 
Snake Indian, who lived in a "Tepee" or 
tent between the station and the bridge, and 
who had crawled up to the bluff to find out 
what tribes were there, their numbers, etc., 
returned and reported that the Sioux and 
the Cheyennes were having a big quarrel 
among themselves, the Cheyennes charging 
the Sioux with being great cowards for not 
taking the bridge when they attempted it, 
and the Sioux retaliating on the Cheyennes 
by charging them with shooting a great 
many of their warriors when they fired down 
the hill at Lieutenant Collins' retreating 
party. The half-breed stated that it might 
have the effect of breaking up the whole 
party, as each tribe declared they would not 
coalesce with the other in the future, and 
in fact were just about ready to turn their 
weapons against each other.'o 
It is clear from Bent's narration that the chiefs 
were actively guiding the operation. They, as 
well as the warriors, were obviously familiar 
with the tactics used in raiding, but they had 
little experience in organizing such a large 
group, the equivalent of two regiments, into 
an effective fighting force. The resulting chaos 
was costly. 
Bent's statement that only eight warriors 
were killed at the wagon train is likely not true. 
When the soldiers ventured out to the site a few 
days later to bury the dead, they counted the 
tracks of some forty travois used to carry off the 
dead and wounded. Furthermore, though the 
Indians scalped all the dead soldiers, they aban-
doned the scalps, which were found lying about 
the site. This was interpreted as an indication 
that they had suffered an unacceptable number 
of casualties and thus could not exult in the 
victory.31Many casualties were also sustained in 
the course of the Collins battle. The casualties 
suffered by the Native Americans were always 
difficult to estimate owing to their tradition 
of removing all their fallen comrades from the 
field of battle, even at great risk to themselves. 
However, it was later indicated that Indian 
runners in the vicinity of Fort Halleck reported 
that the war party had suffered 200 dead and 
wounded.32 
This, then, may explain the extraordinary 
events of the morning following the battle. As 
one witness describes the scene: 
At daybreak, hundreds of the enemy were 
seen standing on the north side of the river, 
but appear more quiet and passionless. 
Standing about in groups, a few came down 
to the shore, making great lamentations, and 
appeared to be mourning. Several squaws 
called out to some Indian women at the 
station that "heap Indians killed yesterday-
many braves"; also that they would kill all the 
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soldiers today. The number in view increased, 
until the forces of yesterday appeared to be 
all purposely shown to us in a grand parade. 
Thus they stood until about 11 a.m. when 
slowly and reluctantly they moved off in 
small squads, till all were gone. On the dis-
tant hills their pickets and rear guard could 
be seen till late in the afternoon.33 
Later that day, reinforcements arrived from 
Deer Creek Station. On July 29, a burial detail 
ventured out to the site of the wagon train 
fight. The soldiers dug a trench and buried 
their comrades. The grave was never marked 
and was soon absorbed into the landscape. Its 
location remains unknown but is currently the 
object of research as development in the area 
threatens to destroy the site. 
July 26 had been a terrible day for the men 
of the Kansas Eleventh, but it could have been 
much worse. Had the river been lower, allowing 
a large number of warriors and horses to cross, 
the station would have been vulnerable to a 
massive attack from the southeast. It is difficult 
to speculate on the course the war would have 
taken had the station fallen. Such an event 
would certainly have inspired the war party, 
and other Native Americans in the region, to 
employ the same tactic against other stations 
along the North Platte, and they too may have 
been confronted by overwhelming forces. As it 
was, the soldiers had exacted too great a price 
for the operation to continue. 
Thus ended the offensive of July 1865. 
Though bold in design and breathtaking in 
magnitude, the operation failed to adapt to 
unanticipated aspects of the battlefield. The 
grand war party broke up, and raiding parties 
headed in different directions to continue 
the war on a scale with which they were more 
experienced. George Bent returned to the 
Cheyenne encampment. 
CONNOR EXPEDITION 
It was a few days later that Connor's line 
finally pulled out of Fort Laramie. The events of 
July 26 may have given his mission new impetus, 
but he was still ill prepared: "I start with scant 
supply and barefooted horses."34 The previous 
months had been a confusion of changing plans, 
failed supply deliveries, and claims of illegal 
appropriations of supplies on Connor's part. 
Properly outfitting the cavalry was a particular 
problem. The time to catch the Indians before 
their horses were healthy was long passed. It was 
the army's horses that were now inadequate in 
number and poor in health. Corn meant to be 
stockpiled for the expedition was used as fast as 
it arrived. Mules were scarcely able to carry their 
saddles. Connor requested six portable forges, 
5,000 horseshoes, and a commensurate supply 
of nails. He needed mowing machines. The 
horses purchased in Canada and sent to him 
were utterly worthless. "Rascally" contractors 
were letting them down and holding things up. 
On July 15, Connor writes to Dodge that he has 
heard nothing of the Indians to the north he is 
about to engage, but "I wish they had contrac-
tor Buckley under their scalping knives."35 With 
the end of the Civil War, it was assumed that 
manpower would be plentiful, but the soldiers 
were all eager to get home and often became 
mutinous when placed under orders to head west 
for yet another war. Even the most fundamental 
stance of the expedition was a point of conten-
tion. On August 11, when Connor was ten days 
out, Maj. Gen. John Pope wired Dodge: 
I have just received copies of instructions 
from General Connor to the commanders 
of his expedition, in which I find the follow-
ing words: "You will not receive overtures 
of peace or submission from Indians, but 
will attack and kill every male Indian over 
twelve years of age." These instructions are 
atrocious, and are in direct violation of my 
repeated orders. You will please take imme-
diate steps to countermand such orders. If 
any such orders as General Connor's are car-
ried out it will be disgraceful to the govern-
ment, and will cost him his commission, if 
not worse. Have it rectified without delay.36 
Sand Creek was casting its shadow. The public 
reaction to the massacre had been one of 
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widespread horror and disgust. A senate inves-
tigation had reached conclusions quite critical 
of the officers and men of the u.s. Army. Pope 
was not about to watch those events replayed. 
The final form the expedition took was 
a three-pronged advance into what is now 
northeast Wyoming and southeast Montana. 
It was an abject failure. The western prong, led 
by Connor, saw the most success. He started 
out from Fort Laramie with 400 soldiers, 145 
Pawnee scouts, and 200 teamsters running a 
train of some 185 wagons. By August 12 he 
was constructing a small fort on the head-
waters of the Powder River, which he named, 
with characteristic modesty, Fort Connor. 
The name was later changed to Fort Reno. 
Numerous small battles erupted with groups 
of Indians returning to the region from post-
Platte Bridge raiding. The Pawnee scouts were 
particularly adept at luring them into traps. 
(Bent's stepmother, Island, was killed in one of 
these fights.) Connor then proceeded down the 
Powder River and crossed over to the Tongue 
River on August 26. Moving down the Tongue, 
he located and attacked a village of Arapahoe 
on August 29, destroying some 250 lodges and 
their contents. Turning back, he reached Fort 
Connor on September 24 and was back at Fort 
Laramie by October 4. 
The eastern prong had left Omaha on July 3. 
It was led by Col. Nelson Cole and consisted of 
sixteen companies, totaling about 1,400 men, 
and a wagon train of 140 six-mule wagons. 
On August 14 they passed Bear Butte, some 
twelve miles northeast of present-day Sturgis, 
South Dakota. At this point, grass, water, and 
game became scarce. A few days later they 
were encamped on a tributary of the Cheyenne 
when they met a party from the central prong 
of the expedition. 
These men had left Fort Laramie on August 
5 under the command of Col. Samuel Walker. 
Leading some 600 men and thirteen wagons, 
Walker had moved almost straight north. He 
was in trouble within six days, finding little 
grass and only brackish water. By the time they 
reached the base of the Black Hills, Walker's 
horses were subsisting on cottonwood bark. 
Scouts were continually sent out and returned 
to report that there was no grass to be found. 
Picking up Cole's trail, they learned that his 
situation was no better than theirs, and though 
they had planned to join forces at this point, 
they traveled separately to maximize use of 
what sparse resources they found. The horses 
began to fail, which at least provided the men 
with meat. Even minor streams and ravines 
required the wagons to be unloaded, moved 
across, and reloaded. Cole estimated that he 
lost at least 20 percent of his provisions while 
repeatedly performing this task. Attempts to 
rendezvous with Connor, as planned, met with 
repeated failure. At this point, the Indians 
began to strike and there was little they could 
do but attempt to defend themselves. The cam-
paign, organized to "punish" the recalcitrant 
Natives and secure safe passage to the Montana 
gold fields, was in shambles. On the night of 
September 9, a storm blew in snow, sleet, and 
freezing temperatures. Four hundred and four-
teen of Cole's horses dropped dead. He burned 
the wagons and provisions that could no longer 
be hauled and began the long walk out of the 
Powder River Basin, the Indians constantly 
harassing h(s rear guard. On September 20, 
Cole and Walker straggled into Fort Connor 
leading shoeless, gaunt, and starving men. 
Despite this, Cole's report claimed they had 
swept the area clean of the Native Americans, 
killing or wounding an estimated 200 to 500 of 
them. Hyde must have mentioned this claim to 
Bent, whose terse reply was, "He did not kill no 
200 Sioux.,,37 
With the escalation of violence experi-
enced in 1864, both sides were anticipating 
a definitive confrontation in 1865. However, 
neither the punch nor counterpunch actually 
connected. The Native Americans brought an 
overwhelming force to bear upon a military 
objective, but they were tactically out of their 
element, attempting warfare on a scale well 
beyond their traditional experience or ability 
to effectively manage. Likewise, the U.S. Army 
was out of its element when it attempted to 
take a style of warfare dependent upon central-
ized industrial production and supply lines into 
GEORGE BENT AND THE BATTLE OF PLATTE BRIDGE 19 
a wilderness, one that was also the enemy's 
home and stronghold. The rough terrain and 
unforgiving environment provided as great a 
challenge as did the enemy. 
George Bent witnessed the entire ordeal. 
With his unique combination of assets-a 
Cheyenne upbringing, a white man's education, 
and ties of friendship and sympathy stretching 
across the gulf that separated the two cultures 
through tragic times-he was able to provide 
priceless insight. 
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MAP NOTES 
1. Walker notes that the survey lines and 
streams are from U.S. survey plats and other 
topography is rendered principally from memory. 
His legend reads as follows: (A) Indians attacked 
the herd on July 25. (B) Each of three bands of 
Indians seen from the roof of the station in the 
early morning of July 26. (C) Fight on the morning 
of July 26 in which Lt. Caspar Collins was killed. 
(D) Body of Lieutenant Collins found. (E) Break 
in the telegraph line, which Lieutenant Walker and 
his detail attempted to repair. (F) Sergeant Custard 
and members of wagon train were killed. (G) Men 
who escaped from the train were met by men from 
the station. (Walker's placement of the wagon train 
fight, F, is incorrect. This position would put it well 
to the west of intervening terrain. W, inserted by 
the author, marks the most likely position for the 
wagon train fight.) This map must be turned about 
20 degrees clockwise to comport in orientation with 
the maps that follow. 
2. This map is entirely in Bent's hand. Origin-
ally drawn from the Native American perspective 
with the river across the top of the page, the map 
is inverted here to comport in orientation with the 
maps that follow. Bent's notes read: "This is the way 
the Indians stood around when Casper [sic] came 
across to be killed," "Camp night before the battle," 
"Where High Back Wolf was killed," "Where 
Roman Nose's brother was killed," "Collins killed 
here," and "Where 22 soldiers killed." In addition, 
he indicates the locations of the Platte River, the 
bridge, the stockade, the creek and in several places, 
the locations of the soldiers and lines of Indians. 
The "line of Indians" along Casper Creek in Fig. 3 
comports well with Walker's description. 
3. Bent marked the map and returned it with 
a short letter dated November 10, 1915. Hyde 
indicated a long string of bluffs as the high ground 
rather than the single large hill featured in Figs. 2 
and 5. Bent indicate s the locations of the Crooked 
Lances (the band to which he belonged), the Bow 
Strings, the Foxes, and near Casper Creek, the 
Chiefs. He locates the Dog Soldiers along the river 
west of the bridge and at the mouth of Casper Creek, 
corresponding to Walker's observations. The path 
taken by Collins was drawn by Hyde and appears 
to indicate the point where the Collins party left 
the road to mount a ridge. Bent places an "X" where 
Collins was attacked. Below that, he writes "this 
band made 1st charge," indicating the Dog Soldiers 
concealed along the bank of the river. This is reit-
erated by the memo written across the bottom of 
the page: "Note: D. Soldiers were closer to Collins 
than other bands." Hyde's notes state: "The broken 
lines and arrow-points indicate the direction of the 
Indian charge." Hyde does not indicate what "A" 
and "B" stand for, nor is there any indication of their 
meaning in Bent's accompanying letter. The actual 
location of the camp was farther up the creek than 
is indicated on this map. 
4. Bent's map suggests that warriors were con-
cealed not only behind the hill northwest of the 
station but also in a line all the way east to Casper 
Creek. Modern construction has destroyed the 
original terrain, but note that Walker's map shows a 
tributary of Casper Creek running through this area 
that would correspond to such a position. Bent's 
map also shows that a line of warriors reached from 
the hill northwest of the bridge down to the river. 
Ravines in the area would have provided adequate 
cover for such a line. The most likely position of 
the wagon train fight, is indicated in the lower 
left corner. The rectangle overlaying the lower 
central portion of this map corresponds to the area 
shown in Fig. 4, http://seamless.usgs.gov/index.php 
(accessed January 2010). 
